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Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is gaining relevance among financial and non-financial 
companies but its benefits still are uncertain. This paper aims at investigating the relationship 
between ERM adoption and firm performance based on a sample of 1130 non-financial 
companies belonging to the STOXX® index. A content analysis of individual accounts is 
performed to distinguish adopters, and a regression analysis explores the effect of ERM 
adoption on firm performance, proxied by Tobin’s Q. The findings suggest that there is a 
statistical significant positive effect of ERM adoption on firm performance, meaning that 
firms are benefiting from the implementation of this process. 
 
Keywords: Enterprise Risk Management, ERM, Firm Performance, ERM Adopters, Tobin’s 




1.  Introduction 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) is a new process for managing risks. It entails the 
adoption of an integrated approach to risks, a focus on all risk categories (financial, 
operational and strategic risk) and the definition of risk as both upside and downside 
volatility1. These characteristics oppose ERM to the Traditional Risk Management (TRM), 
which rather focuses on the separate mitigation of pure risks, in particular financial risks. 
ERM is gaining momentum among firms: according to a survey conducted by the ERM 
Initiative in 2014 the percentage of adopting companies increased dramatically from 8.8% in 
2009 to 24.6% in 2013 in the U.S. This is mainly because firms are coping with increased 
complexity in risks (Beasley, Branson, and Hancock 2014), in particular after the 2007 crisis. 
Since 2005, Standard & Poor’s has included ERM as a different rating category for the credit 
rating of insurance companies, and is currently enhancing this requirement to non-financial 
companies. Furthermore, in 2004 the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Tradeway Commission (COSO) issued the Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated 
Framework providing guidance to adopter firms on how to apply ERM. These circumstances 
brought more and more firms to adopt this process, even thanks to its predicted benefits: 
increased efficiency and awareness of risks, improved decision making and resource 
allocation, reduced earnings volatility (Gates, Nicolas, and Walker 2012). All these effects 
combined are supposed to improve firm performance. Nonetheless, there are still some 
obstacles in the implementation of ERM process. Management and Boards of Directors are 
uncertain about the value creation opportunities arising from investment in risk management, 
                                                          
1 This concept is close to the Chinese thought of risk:  weiji (risk) is the combination of wei (danger) and ji (opportunity) 
(Sean Golden, 2011). 
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and they are feeling the presence of more pressing needs. However, before adopting ERM 
they want to ascertain that it adds value (Barton, Shenkir and Walker, 2010).  
The increased diffusion of ERM and the reluctance of companies to adopt it before proving 
its benefits trigger the motivation to investigate the effects of ERM adoption on firm 
performance. The latter would represent the main research question of this work project. 
Other purposes are to characterize adopters in terms of some accounting variables and to 
investigate whether different sectors benefit more from ERM adoption.  
This empirical exploratory research focuses on a sample of 1130 companies in the non-
financial industry belonging to the STOXX® index and representing five geographical areas 
(Pacific, Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia). Evidence of ERM adoption has 
been derived from the presence of keywords in individual accounts of the companies. This 
research contributes to prior studies by investigating this relationship on a wider sample, 
checking for sector2 and geographical differences. 
The Work Project is structured as follows. Section 2 defines Enterprise Risk Management, 
lists its benefits and costs and explains the existing regulatory guidances. Section 3 continues 
with an overview of the existing literature. After drawing on the research questions in Section 
4, Section 5 focuses on the methodology, the sample and data collection methods are 
described and the model of research is specified. Dependent and independent variables are 
explained conceptually and their proxies are specified. Section 6 focuses on data analysis and 
results (descriptive and empirical) and finally Section 7 concludes, lists limitations of the 
study and gives suggestions for further research. 
                                                          
2 The focus of this study will be on the whole non-financial industry but on nine different sectors: Consumer Discretionary, 
Consumer Staples, Energy, Health Care, Industrials, IT, Materials, Telecommunication services and Utilities (Bloomberg). 
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2.  What is Enterprise Risk Management? 
Enterprise Risk Management is “the process by which companies identify, measure, manage 
and disclose all key risks to increase value to stakeholders” (Segal, 2011). Besides this broad 
definition, there is still not a consensus on what constitutes ERM. The extant literature and 
regulatory bodies3 tend to approach the subject from different point of views, but common 
characteristics stand out. 
Firstly, ERM takes an integrated approach to risks. Traditionally, companies have managed 
risks individually, in a silo-based fashion, each department focusing on their respective 
threats. Enterprise Risk Management, on the contrary, proposes to manage all company’s 
risks as a portfolio. This results in increased efficiency, since the offsetting nature of some 
risks reduce the cost of mitigation. Moreover, by taking on a comprehensive view, it is 
aligned with the business strategy, leading to the achievement of strategic goals. 
Secondly, it includes all risk categories. There are various definitions of risks in the ERM 
context. COSO defines them as “events that can have a negative impact, preventing value 
creation” (COSO, 2004), while events that can have positive impacts are defined as 
opportunities. A different definition is given by Standards Australia and New Zealand, for 
which risk is the “the chance that something happens that will have an impact on objectives” 
(Australian/New Zealand Standards, 2004). It also specifies that it can both have positive or 
negative impact. A similar approach is taken by Sobel and Reding (2004) who define 
business risk as “uncertainties that can impact the company’s ability to achieve its objectives 
                                                          
3 In particular, those who are concerned with ERM frameworks: Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Tradeway 




and can result in interdependent outcomes, both positive and negative” (Sobel and Reding 
2004). This research applies the broader definition, which includes both positive and negative 
volatility, since it mostly reflects the ERM definition of risk as “deviation from expected” 
(Segal, 2011). For what concerns risk categories, the Casualty Actuarial Society provides a 
comprehensive list of risks that include: hazard risks, financial risks, operational risks and 
strategic risks (See Table B1 in Appendix B). Traditional risk management focused mainly 
on financial risks, defined as “unexpected changes in market variables and including market, 
credit and liquidity risk” (Segal 2011). Operational and strategic risk, defined respectively as 
“unexpected changes in elements related to operations (human resources, technology and 
processes)” (Segal, 2011) and to strategy formulation or execution, have been neglected by 
the majority of risk management programs mainly because of problems in quantification and 
because of the apparent superiority of financial risks. ERM, instead, identifies and measures 
all risks, including strategic and operational ones. Indeed, as a 2006 Conference Board survey 
states, the majority of directors (53%) believe that strategic risks are more threatening that 
financial risks, even among the financial sector4. 
Thirdly, in the ERM context, risk is defined as both upside and downside volatility. ERM 
adds completeness to TRM by considering not only downside risk exposure for mitigation 
but also upside risk exposure for exploitation. In this way, ERM contributes to decision 
making by linking risk and return, without sacrificing potential value-creating business 
opportunities. The latter, namely the possibility of balancing risk and return management, is 
part of what Nocco and Stulz (2006) call the “macro-benefits” of ERM. Indeed, they state 
                                                          
4 Brancato et al., 2006. “The Role of U.S. Corporate Boards in Enterprise Risk Management”, The Conference Board 
Research Report No. R-1390-06-RR. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=941179 Accessed on 30/05/2015 
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that this program permits senior managers to measure and monitor the risk-return trade-off: 
the more risk a company (or another entity) is taking the higher return it gets. Through ERM, 
this trade-off is optimized. They also talk about micro benefits: an enhanced risk culture5 that 
permeates the entire company and leads to a better decision-making process. For example, 
managers and all employees in the firm could be able to careful evaluate risk and return of a 
project in the same way, leading to a consensus about any action plan.  
Balancing Benefits and Costs of ERM implementation 
Managers and Board of Directors are, indeed, skeptic about adopting ERM because of the 
uncertain balance between benefits and costs of its implementation. Sim Segal (2011) 
comprehensively identifies the benefits of ERM, and the parties that are better off by its 
adoption. Shareholders can obtain a “higher probability of achieving returns” (Segal, 2011) 
since through ERM the company can more easily execute its strategic plan and give an 
impactful response to its major threats. The firm can become more shock resistant, reduce 
volatility of results and deliver stronger performance. Primary shareholders can also count 
on better disclosures, and consequently on enhanced information about the risks and 
opportunities of their investment. Board of Directors can be more confident regarding the 
understanding of risks inside the company thanks to the rigorous structure of the program, 
enabling their effective management. The C-Suite can benefit from the increased shock 
resistance and a more powerful tool to communicate this information to stakeholders. The 
latter can lead to higher stock prices, since they are able to timely respond to stock analysts’ 
valuation about their capability of facing risks. Management gains from the structured 
                                                          
5 Standard & Poor’s defines risk culture as “the degree to which risk and risk management are important considerations in 
all aspects of corporate decision making” (Standard and Poor’s, 2005). 
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decision making process embedded in ERM, thanks to which it is easier to choose among 
projects with different risk-return profiles. In addition, they are able to prioritize the limited 
resources they have and better allocate them. Lastly, regulators benefit from the lower 
systemic risk triggered by the adoption of ERM in large scale. Besides those benefits, ERM 
is primarily a source of competitive advantage for companies: it leads to a better shock 
resistance, reducing earnings volatility and increasing performance, improving market 
reputation thus leading to a higher company value.  
The major barrier to ERM adoption is that many companies do not regard its benefits as 
exceeding the costs of implementation. In particular, the adoption of such a program requires 
some financial efforts, which companies are reluctant to take because of the presence of other 
priorities or insufficient resources. For example, the implementation of ERM requires setting 
up a risk committee or other bodies in order to oversee the process. Furthermore, change 
management is not easy to coordinate. It would be necessary to instruct employees to such a 
process and implement some training. The whole company would have to change mindset 
regarding risk management, and this would require some time and costs. This research aims 
exactly at proving the creation of value to companies deriving from ERM adoption. 
3. Literature review 
3.1.  ERM Guidances 
So far, several guidance of Enterprise Risk Management have been issued. All of them depict 
it as a process that embrace the whole company and through which it is possible to identify, 
quantify, measure and monitor risks. Non-financial companies are not mandated to adopt or 
follow one of them, as opposed to insurance companies for which the Standard and Poor’s 
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rating evaluation on ERM applies. Below, a brief description of the most relevant ones 
(COSO, AS/NZ 4360-2009, Standard and Poor’s, Turnbull Guidance) together with a small 
presentation of the value-based ERM framework ideated by Sim Segal (2011). 
1. COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework 
In 1992 COSO issued the Internal Control – Integrated Framework, aiming at helping 
companies improving their internal control system and comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley act, 
as a reaction to a period of several accounting and business scandals. In 2004 COSO issued 
the Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework6.  
Within this framework, ERM should be supportive of an entity’s objectives: Strategic (“high-
level goals, aligned with and supporting its mission”), Operations (“effective and efficient 
use of its resources”), Reporting (reliability of reporting), Compliance (“compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations”). COSO also defines the components of the process: Internal 
environment, Objective setting, Event identification, Risk assessment, Risk response, 
Control activities, Information and communication, Monitoring. Objectives and components 
work in concert and the entire program is not thought as a “serial process” but it is rather a 
“multidirectional, iterative process” (COSO, 2004). This type of framework, furthermore, 
addresses ERM applicable to all industries and all categories of risks. 
2. Joint Australia/New Zealand 4360-2004 Standards, ISO 31000-2009 
This Australian and New Zealanders standard sets very general rules about risk management, 
applicable to all kinds of organizations. The framework is composed as follows: 
                                                          
6 Here COSO defines ERM as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, 
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” 
(COSO, 2004, pp.2) 
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communicate and consult internal and external stakeholders about the process, establish the 
context in which the process takes place, identify risks, analyse risks, evaluate risks, treat 
risks, monitor and review.  
3. Standard and Poor’s Enterprise Risk Management 
As already mentioned, S&P included ERM as a different rating category in the valuation of 
U.S. insurance companies. This sets some criteria to evaluate the effective application of 
ERM by insurers. In order to evaluate the risk management of a company, S&P looks at five 
indicators: Risk-management culture, Risk control, Extreme events management, Risk and 
capital models, and Strategic risk management (Standard and Poor’s, 2005). Through this 
evaluation it then categorizes companies on a scale rating the ERM advancement. In 2007, 
Standard and Poor’s announced the intention to enhance the ERM evaluation to rating 
process of non-financial companies. 
4. Combined Code and Turnbull Guidance 
The Financial Reporting Council in UK firstly issued the Combined Code in 2003, in which 
it defined the board’s role as to provide an effective framework to assess and manage risks. 
In 2005, it also issued a revised version of the guidance on the Combined Code, suggesting 
to consider a number of elements when assessing a company’s risk and control processes: 
Risk assessment, Control environment and control activities, Information and 
communication, Monitoring. 
5. Value-based ERM Framework  
The Value Based Framework is a practical guide on how to implement ERM. Sim Segal 
(2011) describes it as articulated in four steps. Firstly, risk identification helps the company 
reducing the list of all the potential threats to 20-30 key risks. Then, risk quantification helps 
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identify the potential impact on the company baseline value (present value of all the cash 
flows to the firm), first on an individual and then on an integrated basis. Thirdly, risk decision 
making helps making decisions on how to manage risk exposure within risk tolerance and 
how to implement the strategic planning. Lastly, risk messaging consists in the 
communication of the process both internally and externally.  
 For the purpose of this research, there will not be any differentiation in terms of 
guidances, since they all share the same underlying principles, which is to propose a process 
to comprehensively identify and manage risks. The increased attention manifested through 
the issuance of such guidances may signal the recognition of ERM benefits by those 
regulators, namely the positive effect that ERM adoption may have on firm performance. 
3.2.  Previous empirical results 
The roots of Enterprise Risk Management can be traced back to 1953, when Robert I. Mehr 
and Bob Hedges theorized the objective of risk management as to “maximize the productive 
efficiency of the enterprise” (D’Arcy, 2001). The focus was initially on only “pure risk”, 
implying either a situation of loss or no loss (mainly hazard and financial risks). “Maximum 
probable loss” and “maximum possible loss” methods became the center of Traditional Risk 
Management, which proposed hedging activities and insurance as the main instruments for 
risk coverage. The possibility of exploiting natural hedges, present in Enterprise Risk 
Management, had still to be considered. Only recently, due to latest developments in the 
market and increased caution of regulators, the attention is shifting towards ERM. There are 
two strands of empirical research on ERM: those exploring the determinants of ERM 
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implementation and those investigating performance and shareholder value creation deriving 
from ERM (Gatzert and Martin, 2013). Some studies are twofold on both purposes. 
a) Determinants of ERM implementation  
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) are among the first to run empirical studies on ERM. Their focus 
is on the identification of the determinants of ERM adoption. Utilizing the appointment of a 
Chief Risk Officer as a proxy for the adoption of ERM, they found that more leveraged firms 
are more prone to appoint a Chief Risk Officer (CRO), but no significant differences 
regarding other variables were observed. Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005), instead, 
found that board and senior manager leadership has an impact in ERM implementation, but 
also size, auditor type, industry and country of domicile can explain the extent of ERM 
deployment. In contrast to the previous studies with US samples, Daud, Haron and Ibrahim 
(2011) examined the factors associated with the level of ERM implementation on Malaysian 
firms. Their results show that ERM is adopted in Malaysia, even if at a very early stage, and 
the factor influencing the level of advancement is the quality of the board of directors. A 
Malaysian sample was adopted also by Golshan and Rasid (2012) who found evidence only 
for financial leverage and the presence of a Big Four auditor. 
b) Impact of ERM on shareholder value or performance  
Gordon, Loeb and Tseng (2009) hypothesized that the relationship between ERM and firm 
performance is contingent upon some factors such as environmental uncertainty, industry 
competition, firm size, firm complexity and board of directors’ monitoring. They found a 
significant effect for all the variables except for environmental uncertainty, but only for high 
performing firms. Grace, Leverty, Phillips and Shimpi (2010) found that ERM practices in 
the US insurance industry statistically significantly increase cost and revenue efficiency (a 
13 
 
proxy for firm performance). This approach differs from the majority of research, which uses 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance. Pagach and Warr (2010), whose study examines 
the change of financial characteristics around ERM adoption, take a different approach. They 
measure the change in Earnings volatility, Leverage, Return on equity (ROE), Slack, Opacity, 
Market-to-book ratio, R&D expense on total asset, Duration ratio, Loan loss provision and 
Tier 1 Risk adjusted capital ratio before and after the CRO appointment, finding no 
significant effect. McShane, Nair and Rustambekov (2010) found a roughly positive 
relationship between ERM rating and Tobin’s Q, but results show that the firm value 
increases with a more sophisticated TRM and not with the adoption of ERM. Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for firm value has been adopted also by Waveru and Kisaka (2011) for a Kenyan 
sample and by Tahir and Razali (2011) for a Malaysian sample. While the former found a 
significant effect of ERM level on firm value, the latter found still positive but not significant 
results. Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) applied the same approach for an US sample, finding 
that insurers with ERM programs are more valued than other non-adopters. Bertinetti, 
Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013) conducted a twofold study for financial and non-financial 
European companies. Firstly, they focused on the relationship between ERM and Tobin’s Q, 
finding strong positive results, and secondly they studied the factors affecting ERM adoption, 
finding significant results for company opacity, size and financial slack. More recently, Ai, 
Chen and Zhao (2014) found evidence for a positive and significant relation between ERM 
and firm value in Chinese non-financial firms.  
The majority of studies focusing on the value creation of ERM found positive results, some 
of them without statistical significance. Another common element in the literature is the 
choice of the dependent variable, Tobin’s Q, defined as the sum of market value of equity 
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and book value of liabilities, divided by the book value of assets, and it is a proxy for firm 
value. The main contribution of this research is to include a wider sample in terms of 
geography, counting not only European companies but also North American, Latin 
American, Asian and Pacific observations, and check for sector differences in the non-
financial industry. Furthermore, a most recent period is observed, namely 2005-2014. In 
order to build the methodology and empirical model, Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal 
(2013) are benchmarked because of the similarity in the purpose, which is to investigate the 
relation between ERM adoption and firm value and performance.  
4.  Methodology and Data 
This is an exploratory study aiming at investigating whether a positive relation exists between 
ERM adoption and firm performance.  
In order to characterize ERM adopters, it is necessary to identify the common elements of 
companies who implement this model. Therefore, a preliminary research question is: 
RQ1: Which are the characteristics of ERM adopters? 
The main question to be answered is: 
RQ2: Does the adoption of ERM affect firm performance? 
Within the ERM context, sector differences exist. This is because they have different level 
of volatility with respect to the market. Within the non-financial industry, Kleffner et al. 
(2003) found that energy firms were more likely to adopt ERM with respect to others because 
of their deregulated and volatile environment, which stimulated the adoption of ERM to 
protect the firm value. This clearly leads to the third and last question: 
RQ3: Do different sectors respond differently to ERM adoption?   
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In order to answer the first question a descriptive analysis is carried out. Then, an empirical 
model will be tested in order to answer the two last questions. 
4.1.  Sample  
This research focuses on non-financial firms. The reason behind this is that financial 
companies have been more heavily regulated in the area of risk management (i.e. Basel 
Accords and Standard & Poor’s ERM enhancement) and they may adopt ERM driven by 
compliance motivations. Non-financial firms are increasingly applying ERM, however their 
adoption is voluntary. It could be then reasonable to hypothesize that they are recognizing its 
benefits. Listed companies have been chosen because, according to Beasley, Branson, 
Hancock (2014) public companies are more likely to carry on the inventory of risks at an 
enterprise level and state to implement a robust ERM process. Moreover, since listed 
companies are more likely to be audited, more detailed information is available. The initial 
sample includes companies from both STOXX® Global 1800 (including 600 European, 600 
American and 600 Asia/Pacific region stocks) and STOXX® Latin America 200, in order to 
have a wide sample in geographic terms. Dropping financial firms, the initial sample includes 
1561 companies from the following industries: Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Energy, Health Care, Industries, Information Technology, Materials, Telecommunication 
Services, and Utilities. Once companies with lacking information have been dropped, the 




Table 1: Initial sample, exclusion criteria and final sample 
  Initial 
Sample 
Exclusion criteria Final 
Sample 
 
# By Country 
 Financial 
companies 
Lack of relevant 
accounting data 
 
Asia 499 106 84 309 
Europe 600 132 119 349 
Latin America 200 51 76 73 
North America 600 122 128 350 
Pacific 101 28 24 49 
# By Sector     
Consumer Discretionary 307 0 102 205 
Consumer Staples 167 0 43 124 
Energy  106 0 29 77 
Financials  439 439 0 0 
Healthcare 145 0 38 107 
Industrials 338 0 83 255 
IT 161 0 57 104 
Material 177 0 35 142 
Telecommunication 
Services 
50 0 16 34 
Utilities 110 0 28 82 
Total 2000   1130 
The period of study is 2005-2014, in order to have observation both before and after the 2007 
crisis, an event that triggered awareness about the weakness of existing risk management 
models. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that most of the adoption has been done from 
2005, because of the issuance of the most relevant frameworks (COSO and AS/NZ 4630) 
between 2004 and 2005.  
4.2.  Data Collection 
All the data are collected from Bloomberg database. In particular, the ERM variable 
construction has been very challenging. ERM adoption is not mandatory for non-financial 
firms, so there is not uniformity in how firms disclose this information, if they do so. Previous 
research has used the CRO appointment as a proxy for ERM adoption, but this is not an 
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appropriate measure. Beasley, Branson and Hancock (2014), indeed, state that organizations 
are not likely to formally designate an individual as the CRO or equivalent executive and in 
their survey, only 31% of respondents designated one. In an attempt to optimally identify 
adopters, Bloomberg database has been used in order to perform a content analysis on 
companies’ individual accounts, filtering them by the sentences “Enteprise Risk 
Management”, “Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)” and “Enteprise-wide Risk 
Management”.  
4.3.  Model Specification 
To empirically investigate the relationship between ERM adoption and firm performance,  a 
regression equation has been drawn. It is not possible to perform a simple OLS regression, 
because of the particular nature of the database, in which the same company presents data for 
different consequent years. The OLS model, indeed, ignores this nature and would consider 
each observation as correspondent to a different individual. A fixed effect panel regression 
model is utilized, in order to take into account the unobservable heterogeneity that exists over 
time and is correlated with the explanatory variables. An example could be the ability of 
management, a characteristic that cannot be observed but at the same time greatly impacts 
the implementation of management models. The appropriateness of such model is also 
confirmed by the Hausman test7, which permits to reject the null hypothesis of a non-
systematic difference between the coefficients. A preliminary univariate analysis was 
performed and the computations have been performed on Stata®.  
                                                          
7 The Hausman test compares two types of estimators (in this case random effect vs. fixed effects). The null hypothesis is 
that the random effect is an efficient estimator of the true parameters. If it is not rejected, there should be no systematic 
difference between the two estimators, otherwise the assumptions on which the efficient estimator is based is not confirmed. 
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𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝐴𝑆𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                             [1] 
Following the hypothesis that ERM adoption affects firm performance, Tobin’s Q is 
considered as a proxy for firm performance and ERM is the main independent variable. This 
model specification has been taken from Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013). A panel 
data specification is used for 1130 companies during 10 years (2005-2014) for a total of 
11300 observations.  
4.3.1.  Dependent variable 
Tobin’s Q is taken as a dependent variable. It is measured as:  
 
Q =   
                     [2] 
Where: 
 Market value of firm = Market value of equity + Book value of liabilities     [3] 
 
 
Tobin’s Q is a proxy for firm performance from the investors’ perspective, namely 
shareholders. Theory suggests that when Q is lower than one, the stock is undervalued, the 
contrary when Q is greater than one. According to Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), Tobin’s Q 
is an appropriate performance measure because it reflects future expectations, differently 
from other accounting measures like Return on assets (ROA). Indeed, the benefits derived 
from ERM are not immediately realized. Lindenberg and Ross (1981) state that Tobin’s Q is 
free from managerial manipulations, since it reflects market expectations, while Lang and 
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Stulz (1994) assert the superiority of Tobin’s Q, by referring to the unnecessary risk 
adjustment or normalization when using this proxy.  
4.3.2.  Independent variables 
Enterprise Risk Management 
The aforementioned benefits of ERM adoption hypothesize a positive relation between this 
variable and firm performance. As suggested by Pagach and Warr (2010), ERM should 
decrease the probability of achieving lower tail outcomes. Previous studies found that among 
insurers, ERM adopters were valued 16.7% more (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2008). Bertinetti, 
Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013) found similar results for both financial and non-financial 
firms, where ERM adopters were valued 12.2% more than non-adopters did. These results 
suggest that ERM should increase firm performance and therefore:  
H1: ERM is positively related to firm performance 
Firm Size 
Firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets. As stated by Tongli et al. (2005), 
firm size must be controlled for. Indeed, superior performance can be attributed to different 
firm sizes. Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013) find a negative significant relationship 
between firm size and Tobin’s Q. Lang and Stulz (1994) and Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
also find a significantly negative relation between size and firm value. Therefore a negative 
relationship between firm size and performance can be expected. 
Financial Leverage  
Financial leverage is here proxied by the ratio of Total debt to Total equity. There is a mixed 
effect of financial leverage on firm performance. On the one hand, increases in financial 
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leverage have a positive impact on performance because of tax savings deriving from it.  This 
is the base of Modigliani Miller second theorem (1963). On the other, the probability of 
default also increases. Based on this, a negative relationship between leverage and 
performance is hypothesized. 
Profitability 
Profitability can be defined as the ability of the firm to make a profit after considering any 
cost, and it is proxied by ROA. The latter is defined as Net income on Total assets and 
measures how a company is able to generate revenue from its investment of assets. It is very 
likely that Tobin’s Q is affected by profitability: the more a company is profitable, the more 
it creates value, thus the more the stock value is likely to increase. Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) affirm that profitable firms are likely to trade at a premium. Thus, a positive 
relationship between profitability and performance is predictable. 
Growth Opportunities 
They are proxied by annual percentage sales growth. Following the research of Gaver (1993) 
and Smith and Watts (1992), it is possible to notice that high-growth firms can benefit from 
higher performance. In the model theorized by Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013), 
indeed, growth opportunities, measured by sales growth, have positive but not significant 
impact on firm value. Therefore a possible hypothesis can be a positive relationship between 
growth opportunities and performance. 
Market Risk 
From the theoretical relation between risk and return, it is possible to argue that more risky 
firms are also more profitable. Market risk is proxied by the beta of the company, 
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representing the percent change in the stock price following a one per cent change in the 
market index price. Liebenberg and Hoyt (2011) argue that variation in Q is driven from 
greater volatility. Furthermore, Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013) find significant and 
positive result on firm value. It can be then predicted that a positive relationship exists 
between market risk and firm performance.  
Dividends 
Dividends are proxied by a dummy variable taking value 1 when a dividend payment took 
place, and 0 otherwise. It is possible to assume that there is a positive relationship between 
firm performance and dividends, since dividends payout indicates that the firm has sufficient 
resources to make such payments. Moreover, dividend payments positively affect 
shareholder value creation, both according to Gordon’s (1962) theoretical framework of the 
“Bird in Hand” and to empirical results finding positive and significant relation between 
dividends and firm performance (Ajanthan, 2013). 
IAS/IFRS 
This variable is proxied by a dummy variable, taking value 1 when the company is adopting 
IAS/IFRS accounting standards and 0 otherwise. Firms adopting IAS/IFRS may have 
improved accounting quality, leading to a positive effect on its value. Daske et al. (2013) find 
evidence that the net effect on Tobin’s Q is positive thus leading to a predicted positive 
relation between IAS/IFRS adoption and firm performance. An interaction effect between 




5.  Data Analysis and Results 
5.1.  Descriptive analysis        
A descriptive analysis has been carried on the whole sample as well as on subgroups by 
geographical area and by sector, differentiating between ERM adopters and non-adopters. 
This helped answering the first research question, about the identification of common 
characteristics of ERM adopters. Chart 1 shows the percentage of adopters in the sample. 
From the data it is possible to notice that the number of adopters increased steadily from 
4.78% of the whole sample in 2005 to 36.11% in 2014. 
Chart 1: ERM Adopters 
 
This appears to be true also for every subgroup. Pacific and North America mostly represent 
early adopters, as well as Energy and Utilities industries. These trends are maintained over 
time, even though the number of adopters considerably increased also in the other subgroups, 
as shown in Charts 2 and 3. 
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Chart 3: ERM Adoption by Sector 
 
Table A4 in Appendix A shows the percentage of adopters crossed between countries and 
sectors. Turning to descriptive results, on average companies show a Q equal to 1.32, 
meaning that on average companies in the sample are overvalued. The minimum value for 
this variable is 0.03 and the maximum is 13.40. Size presents an average value of 8.80 log 
million, in a distribution which contains maximum value of 13.26 and minimum of 4. The 
distribution of leverage presents a mean value of 0.99, according to which the sample on 
average presents a nearly balanced amount of debt and equity. The sample presents a positive 
average for profitability (6.65%) and annual growth (0.09%), meaning that the sample 
contains on average profitable and growing firms. This is also true for the mean value of the 
beta (0.84) which shows an average positive systematic risk of the sample (See Table A1 in 
Appendix A). 
After depicting a general picture of the sample, separate descriptive results have been drawn 
for adopters and non-adopters. Regarding the totality of the sample it has been possible to 
observe that adopters have an average Q higher than non-adopters, meaning that they are 
valued more than non-adopters. They are also bigger and more leveraged. Adopters present 
higher profitability, higher sustainable growth, lower beta and tend to pay more dividends. 




2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples Energy
Health Care Industrials IT
Materials Telecommunication Services Utilities
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These results are consistent with findings in previous studies. In particular, similar results 
about higher size and financial leverage of ERM adopters were found by Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2003, 2011), Beasley, Clune and Hermanson (2005), Golshan and Rasid (2012), 
Bertinetti Cavezzali and Gardenal (2012). This research adds to the previous findings, by 
showing that adopters tend to pay more dividends than non-adopters, grow less, have lower 
betas and do not adopt IAS/IFRS standards.  
A deeper analysis was carried on every subgroup (See Table B4 and B5 in Appendix B for 
more details). The aforementioned characteristics of adopters are somewhat confirmed in all 
the five areas. In each of them, ERM adopters’ Q is lower than non-adopters’. In North and 
Latin America and Europe, adopters are less profitable though. In Asia, they are less 
leveraged and show a higher beta. The same is true also looking at sector subgroups. 
Adopters’ Q is higher than non-adopters’ only in four sectors, namely Consumer Staples, 
Consumer Discretionary, Industrials and Materials. Adopters in the Energy sector show 
lower leverage, as well as those in the Materials sector, which in addition present lower 
profitability and growth, characteristics also shared by the Telecommunication sector. In the 
latter, as well as in the Consumer Staples, Industrials and Information technology sectors, 
adopters pay fewer dividends. Adopters have lower profitability in the Industrials, 
Information technology and Utilities sectors. Finally, adopters in the Industrials and 
Telecommunication services sectors have higher betas. A possible explanation about 
differences in sectors is the cyclicality of each. The regression results will help going deeper 
into the intra-sector and –geography differences. 
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5.2.  Regression results 
Table A5 in Appendix A presents the regressions results. The univariate results show that 
ERM adoption has a significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q, with a coefficient equal to  
-0.075 meaning that ERM adopters have a lower Q by 0.075 than non-adopters. The statistical 
significance of this coefficient can be observed through the p-value equal to zero, lower than 
0.05 thus leading to the conclusion that the result is statistically significant at a five per cent 
significance level. Despite this results, the explanatory power of the model is very low 
(R2=0.0001), thus the model is not strong enough.  
Control variables must then be added. The model includes also SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
PROFITABILITY, GROWTH, DIVIDENDS and BETA, all of them correlated to the dependent 
variable as it is possible to observe from the Pearson correlation matrix (Table A3 in 
Appendix A). The results now support the hypothesis that ERM adoption impacts firm 
performance. Indeed, the coefficient turned positive, equal to 0.045 meaning that ERM 
adopters have an higher Q by 0.045 than non-adopters. The coefficient is significant, now at 
a five per cent significance level (since p-value=0.029). H1 can be then accepted. The R2 has 
increased to 0.13 meaning that the explanatory power of the model has increased. Looking 
at the other variables, SIZE has a statistical significant negative impact on Q, while 
PROFITABILITY, GROWTH and DIVIDENDS have a statistically significant positive result. 
LEVERAGE has a positive impact while BETA a negative one, but their coefficients do not 
result to be significant. Including the variable IAS/IFRS, the previous results do not change. 
It has a negative coefficient but it is not statistically significant, thus it is not possible to draw 
conclusions on the relation with firm performance. When including the interaction term 
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between ERM and IAS/IFRS adoption, the coefficient results to be negative and non-
statistically significant, while the coefficient on ERM increases.  
By performing an F-test it is possible to assess that all the independent variables included in 
the model are jointly significant, thus the regression exists.  
The results obtained are in line with previous research by Waveru and Kisaka (2011), Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011), Bertinetti, Cavezzali and Gardenal (2013), Ai, Chen, Zhao (2014) in 
that it finds a positive and significant relationship between ERM adoption and firm 
performance. 
It is possible to obtain more accurate results by lagging the ERM variable by two years  
(Table A5 in Appendix A, column (4)). This means that the dummy variable will turn into 1 
after two years from the first ERM adoption. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that markets 
do not immediately react to the ERM adoption, if it appears, but it will take some time for 
the information to be reflected into firm’s value8. This modification helps improving the 
model. The coefficient is now 0.1028 with a p-value equal to 0.00, meaning that ERM 
adopters have an higher Q by 0.10 than non-adopters, thus they perform better. The effects 
of the other variables remain the same. From now on, this model will be taken into account 
in order to check for country and sector differences. Also checking for robustness of the 
results9, the positive and significant relationship remains.  
                                                          
8 In particular it is hypothesized that one year after the first adoption is needed to set up the process, while during the 
second year the company can start implementing it appropriately. 
9 By typing “robust” at the end of the regression it is possible to control for heteroskedasticity, a phenomenon that often 
affects data for which the standard deviation of the error is not constant. 
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Performing the analysis for every sub group, the results hold only for some of them (See 
Tables B6 and B7 in Appendix B)10. The relationship is positive and significant only in the 
North American and European area. In the other seems to be positive and non-significant, 
except for Latin America in which it is negative and non-significant. Country differences 
may be in particular driven from different levels of GDP, thus a control variable for real GDP 
growth is also included. Nonetheless, the results do not change and the explanatory power of 
the model (R2) does not improve. Besides macroeconomic variables, culture differs a lot 
between different countries, and consequently the approach to risk, which may be the 
underlying reason for such differences. Lastly, also the age of a company may be a 
discriminator: firms who are older may be in a stable or declining growth phase, thus needing 
for new ways to tackle different categories of risks. For what concerns sectors, the 
relationships holds only for some of them. In particular, ERM positively and significantly 
impact Q only in the Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Industrials 
and Utilities sectors, but when coefficients’ robustness is controlled for, only the Health Care 
sector shows significant results. The others show non-significant relationships. It is possible 
that uncontrolled effects have stepped in, like cyclicality. This could be driven by the 
sensitivity to economic cycles. Indeed, both Utilities and Energy sectors are highly sensitive 
to economic and political cycles. Consumer Discretionary, Industrials and Materials sectors 
are cyclical as well, meaning that they perform well when the economy goes well. Consumer 
Staples and Health Care sectors are, on the contrary, non-cyclical and characterized by stable 
demand. Different sectors also cope with different kind of risks; therefore, even if Enterprise 
                                                          
10 The IAS/IFRS variable is no more taken into account, given its non-significant results on the whole sample.  
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Risk Management comprehensively manages all categories of risks, some of them may react 
differently to a new risk management model. 
An additional and fundamental argument that can explain the differences in results is related 
to how companies disclose ERM adoption. Since regulators do not mandate the adoption of 
such a process to non-financial companies, and its implementation is voluntary, there is not 
a unique way through which they disclose information about ERM adoption. Therefore, those 
results may be driven by different levels of advancement in ERM implementation, that can 
be only checked through an accurate analysis of how companies disclose it. 
5.3.  Additional analysis 
In order to internally validate the ERM variable and to further explore the inequality of ERM 
adoption, a disclosure analysis has been carried out. In particular, a convenience sample has 
been built, namely, the Telecommunication sector has been analysed because of limited 
dimension (34 firms). The first objective is to make sure that those companies who were 
identified as ERM adopters are actually implementing it. The results show that there were a 
very small percentage of errors. Only 8% (3 over 34) of the companies’ analysed result not 
to implement ERM when instead were identified as ERM adopters. The reason is mainly that 
there are companies who mention Enterprise Risk Management in their accounts only as a 
future objective, without practically implementing it. Secondly, the advancement of 
implementation was to be explored. The results show that there is actually difference among 
companies when it comes to disclose ERM adoption. A scoring criterion was identified.  
Table 2: Scoring criteria for ERM disclosure 
0 Not mention 
1 Mention an Internal control guidance 
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Table 2: Scoring criteria for ERM disclosure 
2 
Mention Enterprise Risk Management or a synonym  
(Enterprise-wide risk management, holistic risk management, strategic risk 
management) 
3 Implement Enteprise Risk Management 
4 Extensively implement Enterprise Risk Management, identifying the process 
Results show that the majority of adopters fall in the category 1 or 2. In particular, category 
1 entails the compliance with one of the guidances explained in section 3.1., thus not 
specifically representing a regulatory framework and leaving room for discretion. Therefore, 
since the majority of companies limits ERM disclosure to mentioning the adoption, it is very 
difficult to assess the advancement or quality of implementation. The more advanced an 
ERM process is, the most it can contribute to firm performance. Given the broad variability 
and discretion around implementation quality, it is then challenging to assess its real impact 
on it.  
An additional analysis was carried out to check the existence of the relationship between 
ERM adoption and firm performance by using other proxies than Tobin’s Q.  Profit Margin 
(Net Income/Sales), Operating Margin (Earnings Before Interests and Taxes/Sales), Natural 
logarithm of Enterprise Value, ROA (Net Income/Total Assets), ROE (Net 
Income/Shareholder’s Equity) and Economic Value Added/Total Assets have been assessed. 
Among all of them, only Profit Margin and Natural logarithm of Enterprise Value confirmed 
the predicted relationship; the others presented non-significant results. The reason may lie on 
the way the regression is built, namely, there can be other control variables that are not 
included and cause the relationship to be weak.  
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6.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this Work Project was to empirically investigate the impact of Enterprise Risk 
Management on firm performance. Enterprise Risk Management is a process for managing 
risk differing from traditional risk management: it takes an integrated approach, it considers 
all categories of risks and focuses on both upside and downside volatility. This paper started 
from analyzing the predicted benefits of ERM implementation, mainly better shock 
resistance, reduced earnings volatility and increased performance, improved market 
reputation and higher company value, as well as organizational costs. It then examined 
previous literature, focusing on studies dealing both with determinants of ERM adoption and 
with the relationship between ERM adoption and shareholder value creation. Regulatory 
guidance was scrutinized, even if none of them mandates ERM implementation. A sample of 
1130 companies from the STOXX® index was taken, including North and Latin America, 
Europe, Pacific and Asia geographies as well as Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Energy, Health Care, Industries, Information Technology, Materials, Telecommunication 
Services, and Utilities sectors during the period 2005-2014. Data was collected from 
Bloomberg database and individual company reports were analysed to find evidence of ERM 
adoption. A regression equation was specified, including Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable 
and ERM, Size, Profitability, Leverage, Growth, Dividends, Beta and IAS/IFRS as 
independent variables. A descriptive analysis helped characterizing ERM adopters. They 
resulted to have an higher Q, size, leverage, profitability, a lower growth and beta, tend to 
pay more dividends and are typically IAS/IFRS non-adopters. A fixed effect panel regression 
was then run in order to find evidence for a relationship between ERM and Q, and results 
suggested that such relationship exists and is statistically significant. Separate regressions 
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performed on every subgroup lead to the conclusion that the relationship holds only in North 
America and Europe, and in the Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, 
Industrials and Utilities sectors. A disclosure analysis helped to internally validate the ERM 
variable, and to assess the variability among the quality and advancement of ERM 
implementation. 
As a result of this research, some recommendations arise for institutions related to the 
adoption of ERM. A better geographical distinction may be utilized when defining an ERM 
guidance, since cultural and macroeconomic differences are not to be neglected. Moreover, 
it was noticed that sectors have different shock resistance, and it would be appropriate also 
to discriminate in this sense. Furthermore, minimum requirements for disclosures, and 
standardization of them, may be imposed to ERM adopters.  
The main contribution to previous results comes from the focus on non-financial companies 
and an analysis of a wider sample, checking both for sector and geographical differences.  
This Work Project contains some limitations. Namely, the measurement of ERM adoption is 
not sophisticated, since companies do not have the same way of disclosing such information 
and different quality of implementation exists. Even if a company mentioned being an ERM 
adopter, it is difficult to know whether this is a formal implementation. An area for further 
research may be a thorough analysis of how companies are disclosing ERM implementation 
and how different quality and quantity of disclosure impacts firm performance. Moreover, 
the sample includes only listed firms, while a more extensive analysis also on unlisted firms 
may be appropriate. Future research can also focus on checking the relationship with another 
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics (whole sample) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Q 11300 1.32145 0.99821 0.03008 13.4039 
Size 11300 8.80433 1.30706 3.99899 13.2565 
Leverage 11300 0.99967 6.1787 0 340.3 
Roaprofitability 11300 0.06645 0.14248 -0.5613 8.62417 
Beta 11300 0.84225 43.0602 -1425.3 2346.93 
Growth 11300 0.08968 0.57003 -0.92157 54.22613 
Dividends 11300 0.90708 0.29033 0 1 
Iasifrs 11300 0.409026 0.491675 0 1 
 
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for ERM non-adopters/adopters 
ERM=0      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Q 9032 1.316041 1.01302 0.030078 13.40387 
Size 9032 8.663085 1.300337 3.998987 13.25646 
Roaprofitability 9032 0.064693 0.065681 -0.56134 0.671078 
Leverage 9032 0.943173 5.953121 0 340.3 
Growth 9032 0.094179 0.619247 -0.92157 54.22613 
Dividends 9032 0.905447 0.292612 0 1 
Beta 9032 1.009193 46.79646 -1425.27 2346.934 
Iasifrs 9032 0.414637 0.492687 0 1 
      
ERM=1      
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Q 2268 1.342976 0.936803 0.048447 11.07831 
Size 2268 9.366811 1.175974 6.495121 13.23475 
Roaprofitability 2268 0.073457 0.289722 -0.4724 8.624167 
Leverage 2268 1.22466 7.002278 0 253.4499 
Growth 2268 0.071779 0.302525 -0.83292 12.12761 
Dividends 2268 0.91358 0.281045 0 1 
Beta 2268 0.17744 22.7378 -337.108 525.7243 
Iasifrs 2268 0.386684 0.487098 0 1 
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Table A3: Pearson Correlation Matrix         
  Q Erm L2. Erm Size Leverage Roaprofitability Growth Dividends Beta Iasifrs Rgdpg 
Q 1           
Erm            
--. 0.0411 1          
L2. 0.0294 0.7922 1         
Size -0.3021 0.2255 0.1867 1        
Leverage 0.0117 0.0329 0.0092 0.045 1       
Roaprofitability 0.3105 0.0288 0.0313 -0.1238 -0.0198 1      
Growth 0.0597 -0.0051 -0.0131 -0.0181 -0.0017 0.0243 1     
Dividends -0.1412 -0.0016 0.0322 0.103 -0.048 -0.0045 -0.0663 1    
Beta -0.0139 -0.0165 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0187 0 -0.0038 0.0235 1   
Iasifrs 0.044 -0.044 -0.0126 -0.0168 -0.0094 0.0461 0.0229 0.1332 0.014 1  
Rgdpg -0.1343 -0.1125 -0.0692 -0.1213 -0.0362 -0.0258 0.0554 0.1228 -0.0098 -0.2419 1 
 
  
Table A4: Percentage of adopters by sector in each area   




America  Pacific 
Consumer discretionary 6.06% 26.15% 63.49% 0.00% 14.29% 
Consumer staples 3.33% 21.43% 68.57% 0.00% 50.00% 
Energy  0.00% 37.50% 64.29% 33.33% 85.71% 
Health Care 0.00% 38.71% 63.64% 0.00% 25.00% 
Industrials 11.63% 32.97% 66.10% 23.08% 33.33% 
Information technology 19.51% 28.57% 70.73% 0.00% 100.00% 
Materials  4.88% 27.50% 68.75% 17.65% 41.67% 
Telecommunication services 60.00% 53.33% 83.33% 0.00% 0.00% 
Utilities 18.75% 45.00% 78.57% 12.50% 100.00% 
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Table A5: Regression results       
Q (1) (2) (3) (4) 11 (5) 
Intercept 1.34 3.89 3.89 1.79 1.85 
 
(0.0066)*** (0.1457)*** (0.51191)*** (0.47252)***  (0.48756)*** 
ERM -0.0754 0.046 0.066 
  
 
(0.0199)*** (0.0205)** (0.0239)*** 










-0.3048 -0.33062 -0.0731 -0.0856 
  
(0.0166)*** (0.01739)*** (0.0493) (0.0537) 
Roaprofitability 
 
0.5128 0.5126 0.4493 0.4057 
  
(0.0430)*** (0.0430)*** (0.3996) (0.3688) 
Leverage 
 
0.00148 0.00148 0.00333 0.00332 
  
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.00235) (0.00229) 
Growth 
 
0.04874 0.04858 0.04002 0.0293 
  
(0.0093)*** (0.0093)*** (0.0144)** (0.0081)*** 
Dividends 
 
0.07263 0.06969 0.0775 0.0443 
  
(0.0339)** (0.0340)** (0.0665) (0.0682) 
Beta 
 
-0.00005 -0.00005 -0.00027 -0.00011 
  




















    
3.3476 
          (0.4919)*** 
Observation 11300 11300 11300 11300 11300 
R-Squared 0.0001 0.1309 0.1317 0.1449 0.0433 
F-Stat 14.29 79.32 61.99 3.83 33.77 
Rho 0.7167 0.6915 0.6913 0.7401 0.7544 
*** p-value < 1% 
    ** p-value < 5% 
    * p-value < 10% 
    
       
 
                                                          




Table B1: Categories of risks as defined by Casualty Actuarial Society 
Type of risk Includes 
Hazard risks 
Fire and other property damage 
Windstorm and other natural perils 
Theft and other crime, personal injury 
Business interruption 















Reputational damage   
Competition  
Customer wants 
Demographic and Social/Cultural trends 
Technological innovation 
Capital availability 
Regulatory and political trends  
Source: Casualty Actuarial Society (2003) 
 
 
Table B2: Variables definition 
Variables  Definition 
Q Market value of firm / Total Assets 
ERM Dummy. ERM=1 from the first year of adoption, ERM=0 otherwise 
Size Natural logarithm of Total Assets 
Roaprofitability ROA. Net income / Total Assets 
Leverage Total Debt / Total Equity 
Growth Sales growth  
Dividends Dummy. Dividends=1 if firm paid dividends, Dividends=0 otherwise 
Beta Percent change in the stock price following a 1% change in the market index price 














































Table B3: Literature review 
Author Country Focus Sample 
Dependent 
variable 




Identify the determinants of 
ERM adoption 
26 U.S. companies (1997-
2001) 
CRO appointment 
Size. Leverage. Earnings 
volatility. Stock price volatility. 




Absence of systematic differences between firms 
that appoint a CRO and other firms. More 







factors associated with an 
entity's stage of ERM 
implementation. 
123 US and international 
organizations 
ERM Stage 
Presence of CRO. Board 
members independence. the 
extent of CEO and CFO calls 
for internal audit involvement 
in ERM. Presence of a Big 4 
auditor. Revenues. Industry. US 
based. 
Board and senior management leadership on 
ERM is critical to extensive ERM deployment. 
and other organizational characteristics. such as 
size. auditor type. industry. and country of 
domicile also help to explain the extent of ERM 
implementation 
Gordon. Loeb and 
Tseng (2009) 
US 
Find evidence that the 
relation between ERM and 
firm performance is 
contingent upon some 
factors. 
112 US firms that disclose 
the implementation of their 
ERM activities within 
their 10Ks and 10Qs filed 






industry competition. size. firm 
complexity. monitoring by 
firm’s board of directors 
For high performing firms. all the contingent 
variables are significant except for environmental 
uncertainty. For non high performers. none of the 





Examine the impact of 
Enterprise Risk 
Management on firm 
performance. 
Life and property-insurance 




Firm characteristics (size. 
capital to asset ratio. product 
line mix. A.M. Best rating. part 
of a group of insurers. a 
licensed property-liability 
insurer. publicly traded firm. 
privately held stock company).  
ERM activities 
ERM practices in insurance industry result in 
economically and statistically significant 




Examine the changes of 
financial characteristics 
around the ERM adoption. 
106 firms listed in 
Compustat that appointed a 
Chief Risk Officer 
N/A N/A 
All the changes are insignificant. No effect on 





Investigate the relationship 
between ERM and firm 
value 
82 publicly traded insurers 
for which S&P released an 
ERM rating. 
Tobin's Q 
ERM rating. Size. Leverage. 
Systemic risk. Profitability. 
Cash flow volatility. Growth 
opportunities. Complexity 
Roughly positive relationship between ERM and 
firm value. with a peak for ERM3 and  ERM4. 
The results suggest that firm value increases as 
firms implement increasingly more sophisticated 





Examine the factors 
associated with the level of 
adoption of ERM 
89 board non-financial 
companies listed in 
Malaysia Bourse 




Quality of board of directors 
ERM is practiced by Malaysian firms but it is 
still in an embronial stage. Moreover. the quality 





Test the hypotesis that 
practicing ERM reduces 
firms' cost of reducing firm 
risk. 
69 insurance firm that 
adopted ERM between 
1995 and 2008 
Firms' risk 
ERM adoption. Size. Operation 
complexity. International 
operations. Institutional 
ownership. Volatility of returns. 
Life insurers. Best Sarbanes 
Oxley Act. S&P. 
Firms adopting ERM experience a reduction in 
stock return volatility. The reduction in return 
volatility for ERM adopting firm is gradual and 
becomes stronger over time. Returns per unit of 




Table B3: Literature review 
Author Country Focus Sample 
Dependent 
variable 




Factors influencing the 
level of ERM 
implementation and 
relationship between the 
implementation of ERM 
and company's value 
22 companies listed in the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange 
Tobin's Q 
ERM Level. Size. Leverage. 
Profitability. Dividend policy. 
Growth opportunities 
The level of ERM implementation has a 
significant effect on the value of the companies 




Measure the extent to which 
specific firms have 
implemented ERM 
programs and assess the 
value implications of them 




ERM treatment. Size. Leverage. 
Sales Growth. ROA. 
Diversification. international 
diversification. Dividends. 
Insider share ownership. Life 
insurers. Beta. 
Insurers with ERM programs are valued higher 
than other insurers. and ERM users are 
systematically different from non users. in terms 
of size. leverage. opacity. financial slack. return 




Estimate the relation 
between firm value and 
ERM 
528 public listed Malaysian 
firms 
Tobin's Q 
ERM. Size. Leverage. 
International diversification. 
Ownership. ROA 




Investigate factors that 
influence ERM adoption 
90 Malaysian firms ERM Adoption 
Size. Firm Complexity. 
Industries. Country of 
Domicile. Leverage. Big4. 
Independence of Board of 
Directors. Asset's Opacity. 
Stock Price Volatility. 
Institutional Ownership 
Leverage and the presence of a Big Four auditor 




Examine the relationship 
between Enterprise Risk 
Management information 
content and firm 
performance. 
156 non financial firms on 
the Standard & Poor's 
Toronto Stock Exchange 
Composite Index during 
2007 and 2008 
N/A N/A 
While there were differences in the observed 
average levels of risk assessments. they were not 
statistically significant. It is not possible to 
conclude that the 
assessed levels of economic or market risk 






Investigate the impact of 
ERM on the enterprise vale 
and discover the 
determinants of this 
adoption 
200 European Companies 
both financial and non-
financial (2002-2011) 
Tobin's Q/ERM 
ERM. Size. Leverage. Sales 
growth. ROA. Dividends. 
Beta/Size. Leverage. Opacity. 
Financial Slack. Change in 
EBIT. Value change 
ERM adoption has a strong positive impact on 
company value. ERM adoption depends on the 
company opacity. size and financial slack. 
Jing Ai. Hua 
Chen. Yang Zhao 
(2014) 
China 
Provide evidence for the 
value of ERM  
1506 nonfinancial Chinese 
listed firms 
Tobin's Q 
ERM (dummy). Size. Growth. 
Leverage. Dividend Payments. 
NERI index. Controlling 
Shareholder. Market Index. 
Nature. Business Focus. 
Opacity. Audit Risk. Big15 












Area   Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max       Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Asia 
Q 2902 0.9155384 0.5652522 0.030078 6.863776 188 0.905485 0.4149889 0.3104447 2.707102 
Size 2902 8.59295 1.15664 5.42335 12.5906 188 8.95524 1.14145 6.74255 11.6746 
Leverage 2902 0.710841 1.03134 0 13.5184 188 0.554604 0.486331 0.002977 3.2078 
Roaprofitability 2902 0.041923 0.048316 -0.451881 0.458875 188 0.05362 0.054321 -0.101315 0.505194 
Growth 2902 0.075173 1.01916 -0.921571 54.2261 188 0.072151 0.19462 -0.791528 1.08168 
Dividends 2902 0.969331 0.172448 0 1 188 1 0 1 1 
Beta 2902 2.17555 78.0281 -1425.27 2346.93 188 3.958 38.3729 -5.4387 525.724 
Iasifrs 2902 0.094073 0.291981 0 1 188 0.367021 0.483279 0 1 
Europe 
Q 2896 1.375648 1.065097 0.0685898 13.40387 594 1.299481 1.04753 0.0484472 9.876987 
Size 2896 8.77033 1.42984 4.85647 12.5839 594 9.43489 1.31236 6.49512 12.7691 
Leverage 2896 0.973306 2.3071 0 53.2992 594 1.23301 4.83654 0 82.2899 
Roaprofitability 2896 0.071844 0.0712 -0.535408 0.671078 594 0.057221 0.065601 -0.349152 0.370337 
Growth 2896 0.080165 0.182442 -0.910557 2.62133 594 0.056098 0.139403 -0.517537 1.11433 
Dividends 2896 0.9375 0.242103 0 1 594 0.949495 0.219169 0 1 
Beta 2896 0.482166 20.2159 -308.366 217.366 594 0.460737 18.2952 -166.403 182.724 
Iasifrs 2896 0.944751 0.228504 0 1 594 0.897306 0.303814 0 1 
Latin  
America 
Q 692 1.302205 0.6830353 0.173535 4.590952 38 0.8575231 0.3911319 0.4376018 2.09323 
Size 692 8.2876 1.2553 5.24082 12.4323 38 8.90725 0.783841 6.73659 9.9067 
Leverage 692 0.71378 0.592348 0 3.94755 38 1.14123 1.09554 0.128462 5.21072 
Roaprofitability 692 0.070186 0.054343 -0.313116 0.27599 38 0.058928 0.036784 -0.027567 0.142796 
Growth 692 0.153479 0.248689 -0.498142 3.43132 38 0.123648 0.162216 -0.224697 0.575156 
Dividends 692 0.943642 0.230779 0 1 38 0.947368 0.226294 0 1 
Beta 692 0.896912 2.63744 -21.6656 28.6596 38 0.454758 18.2686 -89.7103 60.6877 
Iasifrs 692 0.523121 0.499826 0 1 38 0.894737 0.311012 0 1 
North  
America 
Q 2218 1.696002 1.17068 0.0344852 11.53689 1282 1.417134 0.8927227 0.1273718 6.967885 
Size 2218 8.87249 1.20926 4.31036 13.2565 1282 9.51425 1.07874 6.67745 13.2348 
Leverage 2218 1.32981 11.6432 0 340.3 1282 1.38142 8.69905 0 253.45 
Roaprofitability 2218 0.082074 0.070146 -0.561342 0.610659 1282 0.066921 0.05869 -0.472397 0.362025 
Growth 2218 0.109813 0.227919 -0.595352 3.69284 1282 0.064841 0.162014 -0.832917 1.23272 
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Area   Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max       Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Dividends 2218 0.760595 0.426816 0 1 1282 0.880655 0.32432 0 1 
Beta 2218 0.244241 20.2439 -315.453 222.829 1282 -0.442568 22.5115 -337.108 197.914 
Iasifrs 2218 0.024797 0.155541 0 1 1282 0.058502 0.234782 0 1 
Pacific 
Q 324 1.798944 1.597392 0.2216343 10.43783 166 1.532504 1.157242 0.2631093 11.07831 
Size 324 7.70107 1.3603 3.99899 11.6137 166 8.55589 1.03588 6.51454 11.6137 
Leverage 324 0.597921 0.804145 0 10.1413 166 0.762083 0.800466 0 7.81237 
Roaprofitability 324 0.074008 0.082344 -0.510385 0.400404 166 0.207819 1.04282 -0.252511 8.62417 
Growth 324 0.155977 0.766486 -0.567348 12.9638 166 0.169179 0.961026 -0.522335 12.1276 
Dividends 324 0.95679 0.203644 0 1 166 0.933735 0.249497 0 1 
Beta 324 0.749559 6.11691 -54.3374 36.8878 166 -0.393124 14.2305 -146.571 15.7831 
Iasifrs 324 0.984568 0.123454 0 1 166 1 0 1 1 
 






Sectors          Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max    Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Consumer  
Discretionary 
Q 1770 1.362042 1.200311 0.034485 10.35975 280 1.454648 1.09897 0.170063 6.967885 
Size 1770 8.53661 1.26577 3.99899 12.5906 280 9.2071 1.11214 6.67745 12.7691 
Leverage 1770 0.860663 2.58301 0 43.1915 280 1.95141 15.3299 0.000409 253.45 
Roaprofitability 1770 0.068414 0.081278 -0.56134 0.567256 280 0.074841 0.064178 -0.16282 0.362025 
Growth 1770 0.098286 1.30124 -0.92157 54.2261 280 0.067574 0.110932 -0.33517 0.515883 
Dividends 1770 0.89435 0.307476 0 1 280 0.896429 0.305249 0 1 
Beta 1770 -0.10994 63.8296 -1425.27 1541.27 280 -1.42994 29.9525 -337.108 116.856 
Iasifrs 1770 0.414124 0.492709 0 1 280 0.325 0.469213 0 1 
Consumer  
Staples 
Q 1041 1.428195 0.960194 0.292687 10.22693 199 1.706425 0.90622 0.433758 5.220745 
Size 1041 8.71065 1.25599 4.31036 11.7552 199 9.32686 1.16812 6.92488 12.1033 
Leverage 1041 0.774381 1.51969 0 32.0573 199 1.78837 4.4959 0.002657 33.6747 
Roaprofitability 1041 0.067325 0.051852 -0.31312 0.510556 199 0.077015 0.057226 -0.34915 0.307634 
Growth 1041 0.079198 0.182564 -0.65781 2.44504 199 0.045304 0.13178 -0.70115 0.953824 
Dividends 1041 0.950048 0.21795 0 1 199 0.944724 0.229095 0 1 
44 
 






Sectors          Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max    Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Beta 1041 0.689935 10.4515 -117.589 160.507 199 -0.33197 19.7691 -244.378 56.3088 
Iasifrs 1041 0.462056 0.498798 0 1 199 0.366834 0.483156 0 1 
Energy 
Q 525 1.357021 1.03608 0.085471 13.40387 245 1.238701 0.650706 0.441887 3.817895 
Size 525 9.12092 1.49237 5.40954 12.5839 245 9.62609 1.07862 6.51454 12.5736 
Leverage 525 0.537483 0.561717 0 5.69895 245 0.52631 0.409427 0 3.37278 
Roaprofitability 525 0.081839 0.072024 -0.19212 0.671078 245 0.155009 0.860437 -0.14057 8.62417 
Growth 525 0.154316 0.278615 -0.77977 2.75112 245 0.099586 0.24696 -0.83292 1.11433 
Dividends 525 0.853333 0.354111 0 1 245 0.963265 0.188495 0 1 
Beta 525 -0.8128 23.0204 -308.366 217.366 245 -1.81518 15.4246 -117.101 63.9911 
Iasifrs 525 0.390476 0.488322 0 1 245 0.453061 0.498811 0 1 
Health Care 
Q 844 1.815036 1.316447 0.070658 11.53689 226 1.779848 1.390549 0.127372 9.876987 
Size 844 8.27895 1.33656 4.91115 11.5196 226 9.37923 1.33283 6.67515 11.909 
Leverage 844 0.563381 0.856291 0 13.5184 226 0.600258 0.480955 0 3.31868 
Roaprofitability 844 0.081623 0.061269 -0.38072 0.468414 226 0.08387 0.077911 -0.28959 0.370337 
Growth 844 0.11239 0.191445 -0.56735 2.62133 226 0.08336 0.148481 -0.21064 1.08548 
Dividends 844 0.758294 0.428371 0 1 226 0.814159 0.389842 0 1 
Beta 844 0.194483 16.7704 -194.505 151.868 226 -0.37623 22.7905 -134.137 182.724 
Iasifrs 844 0.335308 0.472378 0 1 226 0.247788 0.432686 0 1 
Industrials 
Q 2066 1.129954 0.810439 0.030078 7.574908 484 1.177352 0.748339 0.048447 6.49752 
Size 2066 8.60272 1.21955 5.24082 13.2565 484 9.17687 1.18159 6.74255 13.2348 
Leverage 2066 1.09964 5.13502 0 216.743 484 1.2741 7.48594 2.00E-06 161.744 
Roaprofitability 2066 0.056649 0.053838 -0.53541 0.527672 484 0.058086 0.048008 -0.15224 0.240296 
Growth 2066 0.081776 0.158494 -0.58416 1.44968 484 0.061212 0.146011 -0.37958 1.23272 
Dividends 2066 0.954017 0.209498 0 1 484 0.933884 0.248741 0 1 
Beta 2066 0.6889 22.6764 -567.035 422.194 484 2.81726 30.8531 -166.403 525.724 
Iasifrs 2066 0.455954 0.498177 0 1 484 0.39876 0.49015 0 1 
Information  
Technology 
Q 797 1.580553 1.204446 0.083181 9.035887 243 1.450148 0.989521 0.310445 7.034242 
Size 797 8.25739 1.19702 4.85647 11.7434 243 9.09413 1.2141 6.96022 12.1156 
Leverage 797 0.49028 3.11491 0 80.9635 243 0.517792 0.577691 0 3.73983 
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Sectors          Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max    Obs Mean St. Dev Min Max 
Roaprofitability 797 0.074749 0.07917 -0.30176 0.610659 243 0.070132 0.077049 -0.4724 0.285417 
Growth 797 0.083127 0.199406 -0.60165 1.82441 243 0.059867 0.14 -0.58026 0.743869 
Dividends 797 0.782936 0.412505 0 1 243 0.744856 0.436842 0 1 
Beta 797 5.62021 106.631 -205.077 2346.93 243 -2.75673 18.8591 -107.911 58.655 
Iasifrs 797 0.217064 0.412505 0 1 243 0.205761 0.405091 0 1 
Materials 
Q 1171 1.117989 0.711628 0.135006 10.43783 249 1.420354 1.035449 0.402316 11.07831 
Size 1171 8.67236 1.10729 4.85469 11.6137 249 9.04512 1.11926 6.49512 11.6137 
Leverage 1171 1.4192 14.3388 0 340.3 249 0.852977 0.836471 0.000078 7.81237 
Roaprofitability 1171 0.055737 0.062498 -0.34577 0.582615 249 0.055372 0.070119 -0.25251 0.350126 
Growth 1171 0.086532 0.243269 -0.5271 3.69284 249 0.122852 0.790662 -0.57903 12.1276 
Dividends 1171 0.961571 0.192311 0 1 249 0.963855 0.187026 0 1 
Beta 1171 0.316746 19.4915 -315.453 170.79 249 0.279768 20.154 -207.835 74.6804 




Q 247 1.145396 0.495937 0.249443 3.446329 93 1.12226 0.310676 0.623451 1.725185 
Size 247 9.84223 1.61518 5.47424 12.3967 93 10.2347 0.8713 8.35043 12.2 
Leverage 247 1.16291 1.48577 0.014176 16.4517 93 3.30174 11.9044 0.2992 82.2899 
Roaprofitability 247 0.063083 0.058094 -0.16001 0.455513 93 0.055823 0.041422 -0.05561 0.327703 
Growth 247 0.132903 0.856567 -0.54421 12.9638 93 0.052828 0.229966 -0.25021 1.18007 
Dividends 247 0.991903 0.089801 0 1 93 0.989247 0.103695 0 1 
Beta 247 1.14898 10.5155 -77.3758 93.7389 93 1.95233 6.1452 -19.3815 39.5716 
Iasifrs 247 0.659919 0.474698 0 1 93 0.677419 0.469997 0 1 
Utilities 
Q 571 0.97781 0.416802 0.173535 3.413937 249 0.85542 0.22454 0.491488 1.595745 
Size 571 9.37085 1.18534 6.1626 11.9643 249 9.94478 0.866398 7.88651 12.0558 
Leverage 571 1.43579 1.26943 0.138398 10.256 249 1.40043 0.778005 0.0829 6.72515 
Roaprofitability 571 0.041706 0.045518 -0.08911 0.28609 249 0.037156 0.037072 -0.04387 0.505194 
Growth 571 0.08578 0.209192 -0.36596 3.43132 249 0.047967 0.135398 -0.79153 0.672868 
Dividends 571 0.966725 0.179511 0 1 249 0.995984 0.063372 0 1 
Beta 571 4.02222 48.2977 -81.3429 734.931 249 1.8222 6.70361 -20.8468 38.7457 




Table B6: Regression results by Area    
Q Asia Europe North America Latin America Pacific 
Intercept 1.3632812 -0.10681 2.931854 1.695611 1.239215 
 (0.6124)** (0.7765) (0.6860)*** (0.5401)*** -2.2759 
ERM      
      
L2.ERM -0.0309547 0.1007726 0.0887489 0.0393521 0.1079459 
 (0.04569) (0.06213)* (0.0407)** (0.0620) (0.1745) 
Size -0.0731031 0.1309152 -0.1832609 -0.078821 -0.0783647 
 (0.0708) (0.0866) (0.0741)*** (0.0610) (0.2577) 
Roaprofitability 3.375018 2.777162 2.483908 3.334993 0.0417662 
 (0.6313)*** (0.5520)*** (0.4760)*** (0.6515)*** (0.0458) 
Leverage 0.0114949 -0.0020169 0.0043281 -0.0262608 0.3726572 
 (0.0122652) (0.00233) (0.0019)** (0.0485) (0.2083)* 
Growth 0.02543 -0.0517462 0.1186555 -0.044705 0.105975 
 (0.002)*** (0.0633) (0.0716)* (0.0960) (0.0621)* 
Dividends 0.0053693 0.0524168 -0.0139125 -0.0169122 0.5172324 
 (0.0418) (0.05198) (0.1056) (0.1199) (0.4421) 
Beta 0.0005927 0.0003258 0.0009719 0.0006058 -0.0382573 
 (0.002) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0025) (0.0091) 
IAS/IFRS      
      
ERM*IAS/IFRS      
      
RGDPG -0.5073082 1.634795 5.973047 1.720226 3.626148 
  (0.3397) (0.2599)*** (0.5135)*** (0.6228)*** (2.5293) 
Observation 2472 2792 2800 584 392 
R-Squared 0.3539 0.0515 0.4733 0.2765 0.1083 
F-Stat 85.66 19.4 31.8 9.6 5.7 
Rho 0.637 0.7698 0.6592 0.6313 0.7942 
*** p-value < 1%      
** p-value < 5%      
* p-value < 10%      
      
 
 
                                                          
12 Robust coefficients 
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Table B7: Regression results by sectors (robust coefficients) 
Q Cons. Discr Cons. Staples Energy Health Care Industrials IT Materials 
Telecommunication 
 Services Utilities 
Intercept -2.539347 -0.3383816 5.845382 3.315685 0.8656123 2.464781 5.2821 1.834126 1.988177 
 (1.14863)**  (0.77006) (0.77213)*** (1.3760)** (0.40681)** (1.478)* (2.0377)** (2.5151) (0.4701)*** 
ERM          
          
ERM2 0.1157905 0.0748396 -0.0579846 0.360797 0.078059 0.0587974 0.091152 0.0480507 -0.0017104 
 (0.1021) (0.09004) (0.06861) (0.12849)*** (0.0576) (0.07594) (0.1442) (0.08571) (0.02636) 
Size 0.3858713 0.1624505 -0.5285814 -0.2292068 0.0022446 -0.1412417 -0.45968 -0.0917601 -0.1296764 
 (0.1303)*** (0.08643)* (0.08269)*** (0.1589) (0.04671) (0.1749) (0.2033)** (0.2487) (0.04767)*** 
Roaprofitability 3.866899 4.135074 -0.0096227 3.471831 1.927656 2.214407 1.146411 1.19364 1.12723 
 (0.6269)*** (0.98665)*** (0.0317) (1.5952)** (0.40334)*** (0.6136)*** (1.2815) (1.2359) (0.9850) 
Leverage 0.0079037 0.0020816 0.0389202 0.1066294 0.0022218 -0.0097902 0.003311 -0.0052265 0.0014554 
 (0.00059)*** (0.0089) (0.0650) (0.0738) (0.00204) (0.00289)*** (0.00827) (0.0013)*** (0.0126) 
Growth 0.023601 0.0245752 0.0392055 0.519429 -0.0500199 0.1656497 -0.07848 0.2996549 0.0585648 
 (0.00224)*** (0.0661) (0.0542) (0.20664) (0.04970) (0.13607) (0.0475) (0.18795) (0.06199) 
Dividends 0.1974697 -0.0098624 0.3107358 -0.202858 0.0001164 -0.1216759 -0.29172 0.075076 0.0859198 
 (0.1129)* (0.10163) (0.1997) (0.1130)* (0.0632) (0.1518) (0.2937) (0.0510) (0.03705)** 
Beta 0.0019697 -0.0018034 -0.0005464 0.0008001 0.0003827 0.0001508 -0.00222 -0.0027606 0.0007216 
 (0.00202) (0.00098)* (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0005) (0.00141) (0.00236) (0.00421) (0.00075) 
IAS/IFRS          
          
ERM*IAS/IFRS         
          
RGDPG 1.907294 2.290099 5.085868 2.92071 3.078962 2.548491 3.410507 1.295472 1.49721 
  (0.71248)*** (0.5828)*** (0.9587)*** (0.8333)*** (0.3565)*** (0.8539)*** (1.8057)* (0.5661)** (0.34588)*** 
Observation 1640 992 616 856 2040 832 1136 272 656 
R-Squared 0.0102 0.2069 0.1337 0.3325 0.1316 0.2625 0.059 0.2156 0.4206 
F-Stat 70.45 3.63 12.63 4.45 21.23 5.86 8.34 - 5.45 
Rho 0.8226 0.7952 0.7206 0.6548 0.8207 0.6756 0.7246 0.5021 0.7281 
*** p-value < 1% ; **p-value < 5%; * p-value < 10% 
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